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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, a well-known and well-connected drug dealer was
approached by a joint federal, state and local law enforcement task force operat-
ing through the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA").' Through his work as a
confidential informant with the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force
("Task Force"), Paul Lir Alexander helped this unit become one of the most
successful drug task forces in the United States.2 He worked very closely with
undercover agents, Bernard B. Kerik and Jerry Speziale, to break up an interna-
tional drug cartel.3 In exchange for his help, Mr. Alexander received a portion
of the money the Task Force had confiscated.4 Although he was a confidential
informant, Mr. Alexander became a close friend and confidant of the two under-
cover agents.5
His involvement, however, was conditioned on the fact that these un-
dercover agents would keep his identity a secret. 6 Mr. Alexander, as well as Mr.
Kerik and Mr. Speziale, knew what happened to people who betrayed a major
Colombia drug cartel.7 All three of the close friends knew that any unsuccessful
busts must be blamed on someone other than Mr. Alexander or Mr. Alexander
would quickly face repercussions by the dangerous Colombian drug lords.8 In
particular, Mr. Kerik explains:
Jerry's problem was that if Paul remained on the hook for the
lost shipment [767 kilos in August 1991], the Colombians
would simply kill him. Jerry needed to shift the blame away
from Paul. To do this, [Mr. Kerik and Mr. Speziale] fooled the
I See BERNARD B. KERIK, THE LOST SON 201 (HaperCollins 2001).
2 Id. at 208.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 227.
5 Id.
6 See Brief of Appellant at 4, Alexander v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 132 F. Appx. 250
(1 th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-12801).
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Colombian drug lords by placing a fake story about the bust in a
New York newspaper. The article blamed the bust on the local
contacts claiming that they were caught because the van used
had expired plates.9
In another section, Mr. Kerik explained in more explicit detail the dan-
ger of dealing with the drug lords as a confidential informant.
Paul was on the phone with two Colombian drug brokers ... the
guys he'd worked with seven months earlier on the previous
deal, the 767 kilos that we'd seized and then covered up with a
phony newspaper story. ... Then Paul heard a loud noise and
the phone went dead. ... It had taken seven months for the car-
tel to decide, but eventually blame had been assigned - this time
squarely on the shoulders of the two brokers. ... With the car-
tels, someone is always held responsible.10
Although Mr. Alexander was working hard for the Task Force, 11 he also
was double dealing by using another alias to bring in loads of cocaine through
Miami.12 Mr. Alexander was eventually apprehended by the Miami DEA for
attempting to smuggle 1,700 kilograms of cocaine into Miami, hidden in the
generators and transformers of his airplane. 13 Mr. Kerik and Mr. Speziale felt
extremely betrayed by Mr. Alexander's double-dealing, especially since the
Miami DEA originally thought that the two agents were part of Mr. Alexander's
other schemes.14
After leaving the Task Force, Mr. Kerik eventually became the New
York City Police Commissioner and held this position during the September 11
terrorism attack.' 5 After this tragedy, he wrote his memoirs, including previ-
ously unknown details16 about Mr. Alexander and his involvement with the Task
9 Id.
'0 Id. at 207-08.
" Id. at 229. In fact, Mr. Kerik had said, "Paul has made us stars in the drug world of law
enforcement." Id.
12 See Id. at 226-29. Specifically, Mr. Kerik explains, "For every load he did with us, Paul
was doing two or three loads behind our backs." Id.
13 See Id. at 228.
14 See Id. at 229. Mr. Kerik states:
[W]e hadn't known about any of his side dealing. When Paul confirmed that
we were in the dark, the Miami DEA finally dropped its investigation of us.
We were relieved, but we were sad too. At his trial, Paul was found guilty
and sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. I never saw him again.
15 See ld. at 241.
16 See Id. at 200-29; see also Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 5-13. In particular, the Ap-
pellant's Brief explains that the following previously publicly unknown details about Mr. Alexan-
der's life were released: Mr. Alexander's name tied to the Task Force. Mr. Alexander's location in
20051
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Force. 17 Mr. Kerik, in breaking Mr. Alexander's confidence, released details
about Mr. Alexander's physical description, 18 an entire list of his aliases, '9 and
detailed descriptions of how he helped the Task Force become one of the most
successful units in the United States.20  Although the book focused on Mr.
Kerik's life and experiences, he used his book to "out" Mr. Alexander to the
Colombian drug cartels, putting his life and that of his family in danger of re-
taliation.2' In response to the publication of Mr. Kerik's book, Mr. Alexander
filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia claiming common law negligence and public disclosure of private-
facts.22 However, this case was quickly dismissed by the district court, which
held that Mr. Kerik's disclosures of Mr. Alexander's private information were
protected by the First Amendment. 23 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit rendered a decision on Mr. Alexander's appeal by simply affirming
the lower court's decision. 24 The Eleventh Circuit did not address, in its opin-
ion, any of Mr. Alexander's privacy tort claims argued within his brief.25
Mr. Alexander's case represents a broad category of cases where private
citizens, in an effort to protect their own privacy, seek civil remedies for public
disclosure of private-facts. Like Mr. Alexander, these private individuals have
had their confidences and privacy violated by mass publication of intimate de-
tails of their lives. Although these plaintiffs feel that a civil remedy should be
available to protect their privacy interests, most disclosure of private-fact ac-
tions are blocked by absolutism approaches adopted by trial and appellate courts
which allow the First Amendment protections to bar the plaintiffs privacy in-
terests.26 These courts fail to balance First Amendment rights of free press with
1991, Mr. Alexander's physical description, information about Mr. Alexander's wife, Mr. Alex-
ander's knowledge of the Colombian drug cartel, all of Mr. Alexander's aliases, and Mr. Alexan-
der's current whereabouts.
17 Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 5.
18 KERIK, supra note 1, at 201-02.
19 See Id. at 229.
20 See Id. at 200-29.
21 Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 3.
22 See Alexander v. News Corp., No. CV203-158, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27990, at *2-3 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 19, 2004).
23 See infra Section II. After filing suit against Mr. Kerik, Mr. Alexander also filed suit
against Gerald Speziale, who also wrote a book detailing his experiences as an undercover agent
on the Task Force. Mr. Speziale's book was entitled WITHOUT A BADGE: UNDERCOVER IN THE
WORLD'S DEADLIEST CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia also dismissed this case based on the reasons within Alexander v. News Corp. See
Alexander v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. CV203-114, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11870, at *8-9
(S.D. Ga. June 18, 2004).
24 See Alexander v. HaperCollins Publishers, Inc., 132 F. Appx. 250, 251 (11 th Cir. 2005).
25 See Id.
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
[Vol. 108
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an individual's privacy interest.27 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has had
numerous opportunities to prohibit the public disclosure of private-facts as a
legitimate tort claim,28 it has refused to extend the First Amendment doctrine as
an insurmountable obstacle to invasion of privacy claims. 29 Therefore, the Su-
preme Court has left a small hope for plaintiffs who seek some retribution from
the media for the publication of their own private and embarrassing facts.
However, even with the Supreme Court's refusal to close the door on a
legitimate tort claim for the publication of private-facts, only one U.S. Court of
Appeals has upheld a plaintiff's claim for damages on this tort theory.3° Instead,
most of these courts have continuously held that these claims are barred by the
First Amendment.3 ' In examining the plaintiffs' abilities to bring a successful
claim, many of the circuit courts have focused on whether the material pub-
lished is of a "legitimate public interest. ' 32 In almost every single circuit court
case concerning a private-fact tort, the circuit courts have determined that the
plaintiff's private and embarrassing information published was of a legitimate
public interest. 33 Therefore, these court decisions have led several commenta-
tors to reason that the public disclosure of private-facts tort is not a legitimate
cause of action.34
27 See infra Section III.
28 These potential causes of action are often referred to as private-fact torts.
29 See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524
(1989) (holding that there is no cause of action for invasion of privacy from a newspaper publish-
ing the name of a rape victim, but leaves open whether there may be a valid cause of action for
publication of private-facts in the future); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)
(holding that West Virginia statute was unconstitutional because it prohibited a newspaper from
publishing the name of any youth offender even though the reporters obtained the student's name
from interviewing witnesses); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that
there is no cause of action for invasion of privacy grounded upon the publication of the name of a
deceased rape victim, which was obtained by a television station from official court records open
to the public, but refusing to determine that there is no case where the publication of the private-
facts may be a viable cause of action).
30 See generally Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1994), Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993), Ross v. Midwest Commc'ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1989);
Gilbert v. Medical Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d
395 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977).
31 See supra note 30.
32 See Id.
33 Supra note 30; for examples of state courts who follow this reasoning, see generally Anon-
sen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App. 1993); Pasadena Star-News v. Superior Ct., 203 Cal.
App. 3d 131 (1988); Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Co., Inc. 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986); Freihofer v.
Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1985); Howard v. Des Monies Register and Tribune Co., 283
N.W.2d 289, 300 (Iowa 1979); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1975); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 76 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa 1956).
34 See Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice
and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 57 (1974); Geoff Dendy, The Newsworthiness De-
fense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85 Ky. L.J. 147, 164 (1997); Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of
Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329, 334 (1979); Theodore L.
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This note will examine the small hope left behind by the Supreme Court
for plaintiffs who wish to bring claims for the publication of private-facts. It
will also explain how the lower courts have been willing to placate the impor-
tance of preserving privacy interests, but are unwilling to enforce the tort - the
public disclosure of private-facts - created to protect these important privacy
interests. As this note will explain, the courts should not look at the tension
between the private-fact tort and the First Amendment right to free speech and
press with an absolutism stance. This absolutism stance means that the courts
tend to feel that they must make a choice between the First Amendment and
privacy issues. To many courts, there is nothing in between these concepts - no
middle ground.
As a solution, this note will suggest a two-part scheme for courts to
adopt so that they can properly move away from their absolutism stance. First,
the courts should adopt a new tort - breach of confidence. The breach of confi-
dence tort will give a remedy to people who have had private information about
themselves published by a person who has entered into some kind of confiden-
tial relationship with the plaintiff. Second, the courts should adopt another sys-
tem to help protect people when their private information is published by some-
one with whom they did not have a confidential relationship. This new scheme
advances a "pyramid" balancing test to help courts better determine when there
is a legitimate public interest. This pyramid test gives much more weight to
privacy issues than other court decisions that have attempted to balance privacy
interests against the First Amendment. This test will force the courts to not look
at the issue in terms of absolutism, but to come to a middle ground where the
principal ideals behind privacy rights and the First Amendment can both exist.
More specifically, Part II of this note will briefly look at the district
court's opinion in Mr. Alexander's case to show an example of how many
courts look at "legitimate public interest." Part I will examine the historical
tension between invasion of privacy and the First Amendment. Part IV will
discuss where the U.S. Supreme Court has left private-fact plaintiffs. Part V
will examine the newsworthiness defense, balancing test options, and breach of
confidence as a new tort. Finally, Part VI will explain how the courts can use
the "pyramid" scheme to determine when information is of a "legitimate public
interest." It will also discuss why courts should adopt a breach of confidence
tort.
Glasser, Resolving the Press-Privacy Conflict: Approaches to the Newsworthiness Defense, 4
COMM. & L. 23, 31 (1982); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem For A Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 353 (1983).
[Vol. 108
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II. ALEXANDER V. NEWS CORPORATIONs: AN EXAMPLE OF How THE LOWER
COURTS FAIL TO PROTECT PLAINTIFFS FROM THE PUBLICATION OF THEIR OWN
PRIVATE-FACTS
When Mr. Alexander realized that Mr. Kerik had written a memoir dis-
closing information about his private life, including the time he had spent as a
confidential informant with the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force, Mr.
Alexander filed a pro se complaint from his prison cell seeking damages.35 Mr.
Alexander, whose life was now endangered, wanted Mr. Kerik to pay for what
Mr. Alexander thought was the unnecessary disclosure of information concern-
ing his private life.36 However, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia reasoned that Mr. Alexander's claim was barred by the First
Amendment right of the free speech and press.
The district court construed two claims from Mr. Alexander's pro se
complaint - invasion of privacy and negligent disclosure of private-facts.38 Al-
though the district court acknowledged that the defendant's First Amendment
rights to free speech and free press are not absolute, the court held that subject-
ing the defendant to civil liability for the publication of private-facts about Mr.
Alexander's activities would violate fundamental First Amendment rights.39 In
drawing this conclusion, the court examined both claims and determined that
Mr. Alexander's criminal activities were of a "legitimate public interest.' 4°
Therefore, the court reasoned that, per the First Amendment, a matter of legiti-
mate public interest cannot be the basis for an invasion of privacy claim.4 1
A. First Attempt: Invasion of Privacy
To recover under a theory of invasion of privacy in Georgia, the court
stated that Mr. Alexander must show "(1) the public disclosure of private-facts;
(2) the facts disclosed must be private, secluded and secret facts; and (3) the
matter made public must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of
35 Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 3.
36 Id. at 3-5.
37 Alexander v. News Corp., No. CV203-158, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27990, at *9-10 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 19, 2004).
38 Id. at *1-2.
39 Id. at *8-9.
40 Id. at *8-10.
41 In making its decision, the court made no reference to Cohen v. Cowles Media Co, 501 U.S.
663 (1991). This case allowed a plaintiff to recover damages "under state promissory estoppel
law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality" even though the newspaper claimed
such a suit violated its First Amendment rights. Id. at 665. Although there was no contract signed
between Mr. Kerik and Mr. Alexander, it is possible that Mr. Alexander could have a cause of
action under this claim. However, as a pro se plaintiff, Mr. Alexander probably did not plead
such a claim and therefore, the court was unable to address this issue. Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co. is discussed in detail in Section V(C)(2).
2005]
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ordinary sensibilities under the circumstances. 42 However, assuming that Mr.
Alexander could have met these elements, his case was still barred by the First
Amendment because "'[w]here an incident is a matter of public interest, or the
subject matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection therewith
can be a violation of no one's legal right of privacy. 43 The court reasoned that
"the details of Alexander's involvement in these investigations and drug busts
are logically related to this discussion of important law enforcement efforts."
44
Because Mr. Alexander's drug activities and his involvement as a DEA infor-
mant concerned a matter of public interest, the court held that Mr. Alexander
failed to state a cognizable claim in light of the defendants' First Amendment
rights of free speech and press.45
B. Second Attempt: Negligent Disclosure
In addition to rejecting Mr. Alexander's invasion of privacy claim, the
court reasoned that Mr. Alexander's negligent disclosure claim was barred by
the First Amendment.46 The court reasoned that "the First Amendment prohibits
a court from imposing liability on the truthful publication of matters of public
concern. 47 Because Mr. Alexander did not allege that any of the information
published about him was false, the court held that his negligent disclosure claim
was also barred by the First Amendment.48
C. Simply Another Court Refusing to Act on the Small Hope
In Mr. Alexander's case, the court held that defendant-publisher and de-
fendant-author disclosed information that was of a legitimate public interest.
49
As with many of the cases involving the publication of private-facts, 50 the dis-
trict court did not outright reject a private-fact tort as a cause of action.51 In-
stead, the court held that the plaintiff, Mr. Alexander, failed to overcome the
First Amendment barrier by proving that the information was not of a public
concern. 52 Even though this court did not reject a private-fact tort as a cause of
42 Alexander v. News Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27990, at *8 (citing Pierson v. News
Group Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635, 641 (S.D. Ga. 1982)).
43 Id. at *9 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d 384, 386 (Ga. App. 1985)).
44 Id. at *10.
45 Id.
46 Id. at *ll.
47 Id. (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001)).
48 Id.
49 Id. at *10.
50 See supra note 30.
51 See Alexander v. News Corp., No. CV203-158, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27990, at *8-11
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action, it did severely limit the ability of any plaintiff to successfully sue for the
release of any private information. Similar to many other lower court decisions,
this district court limited the plaintiffs ability to succeed to only cases that in-
volve some unidentified extreme situation where private-facts were disclosed to
the public.53 Based on this court's decision, that situation must be more extreme
than exposing a plaintiff to potentially life-threatening danger from the publica-'
tion of his private information.
III. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?: A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE TENSION
BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The First Amendment contains important and fundamental constitu-
tional rights that have allowed the American citizenship to be more informed
about our government, our society, our culture, and ourselves as a nation.54
Underlying the First Amendment right of free speech and press are "society's
needs for maximum flow of information and opinion and the individual's right
to fulfillment., 55 Having this important right of expression allows our society to
engage in a marketplace of ideas, where citizens can freely exchange ideas and
thoughts.56 The First Amendment also has played an important aspect in the
development of today's media. Few limitations on the First Amendment have
allowed our media to explore interesting and important stories that are of a le-
gitimate public interests. For example, without the protections of the First
Amendment, the New York Times would not have been able to publish their
articles on the Pentagon Papers.57 Or, more broadly, without the protections of
the First Amendment, media outlets could not critique the activities of our gov-
ernment without facing criminal punishment. 5
However, the First Amendment does have some limitations to the ex-
pansive protection of free speech and press.59 There are certain limited classes
of speech which may be prevented or punished by a state consistent with the
principles of the First Amendment. These categories are: (1) obscene speech;60
53 See supra note 30.
54 See DWIGHT L. TEETER, JR. & BILL LOVING, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS, I (10th ed.
2001).
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id. at 7.
57 See New York Times Co. v. U.S., 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding that the government could
not impose prior restraint upon the newspaper to stop them from publishing the Pentagon Papers).
58 See TEETER & LOVING, supra note 54, at 28.
59 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (publishing
likeness without consent); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (clear and present
danger test); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (defamation); Roth v. U.S.,
354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting
words doctrine).
60 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973).
2005]
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(2) defamation;6' (3) speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute;62 and, (4) speech which is directed to incite
or produce imminent lawless action.63
In addition to these staples of the First Amendment, the right of privacy
has also become an important part of First Amendment dogma. The right of
privacy is the "right to be let alone." 64 It can be more broadly stated as "the
right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's per-
sonality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no
legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in
such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a
person of ordinary sensibilities. 65 This right of privacy is recognized as both a
common-law tort action66 and as a constitutional right.61 Even though both the
First Amendment and the right of privacy have constitutional significance, these
rights tend to clash with each other.68 And, most times, the courts give the First
69Amendment more deference than the right of privacy.
But, in today's world, the right of privacy should be given more impor-
tant credence. "Increasingly, it is more difficult for individuals to keep informa-
tion about themselves from indiscriminate use by government agencies, from
snooping businesses, or from predatory criminals who steal credit cards num-
bers and infest the Internet. 7 ° Individuals have a constant fear of identity theft,
others overhearing their private cellular telephone conversations, and still others
reading private e-mails containing personal information about their lives. Due
to the Internet and telecommunications industry, any individual's private infor-
mation concerning embarrassing facts about their lives can fall easily into an-
other's hands and this person may wish to publish these private facts. This
situation exhibits the tension between the right of privacy and the freedom of the
press, especially arising from the unauthorized publication of true but embar-
rassing facts.7 ' In order to thoroughly examine this tension, it is important to
look at the beginning of the right of privacy and the birth of lawsuits surround-
ing the publication of the private-facts.
61 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
62 See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
63 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
64 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
65 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 1 (2005).
66 See Id. at § 8.
67 See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68 See Glasser supra .note 34, at 23.
69 See infra Section V.
70 Supra TEETER & LOVING, supra note 54, at 335.
71 See Glasser supra note 34, at 23.
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A. The History of the Right of Privacy: Brandeis and Warren's Idea
The right of privacy was first developed in a now famous 1890 article
by Samuel D. Warren and his law partner, Louis D. Brandeis. 72 The two law-
yers wrote the article in a critical response to the current heyday of "yellow
journalism" and the mass publicity given over the wedding of Warren's daugh-
ter.73 Throughout the article, the authors urged courts to enforce an obligation
on the media to recognize a "right to be let alone., 74 To make this jump, War-
ren and Brandeis observed protection of individual property as gradually being
expanded to include protection of one's self, reputation, and general well-
being.75
Although Warren and Brandeis are credited with the creation of the
right to privacy, Professor William L. Prosser gave the common-law tort more
depth and meaning. Professor Prosser categorized the invasion of privacy tort
into four specific areas: (1) intrusion upon a person's solitude or seclusion; (2)
appropriation of a person's name or picture for another's financial benefit; (3)
public disclosure of private, embarrassing facts about a person; and (4) public-
ity that places a person in false light. 76 Over the next fifty years, most state
legislatures 77 and the U.S. Congress 78 have adopted some version of Brandeis
and Warren's and Prosser's right to privacy.
In addition to the common-law tort right of privacy, the U.S. Supreme
Court began to speak of a "constitutional" right of privacy in the 1950s. 79 Al-
though never mentioned in the Constitution, the right of privacy was officially
given constitutional footing in 1965 with Griswold v. Connecticut.80  Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right against governmental
72 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
73 Christine Hart, Note, Y.G. v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis: Breathing Life into the "Disclo-
sure of Private-facts" Tort, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 931, 933 (1990-91).
74 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 64, at 195.
75 Id. at 195-98.
76 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
77 See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 11 (2005).
78 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (bars credit agencies from sharing
credit information with anyone but authorized customers); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(2000) (bars federal agencies from letting information they collect for one purpose be used for a
different purpose); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000) (sets strict proce-
dures when federal agencies want to look through customer records in banks); Video Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000) (prevents retailers from disclosing video-rental records
without the customer's consent or a court order also forbids the sale of the records); Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (regulates computer match-
ing of federal data for verifying eligibility of federal benefits programs).
79 Please note that there is a distinction between the common-law right of privacy under which
a person can sue another person and the constitutional right of privacy under which a person can
sue for unlawful governmental interference into a private matter.
80 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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inference within a person's zone of autonomy, establishing a right of privacy.81
In describing this new right, Justice Goldberg stated "the right of privacy is a
fundamental personal right, emanating from the totality of the constitutional
scheme under which we live.",82 He also stated that such a "fundamental per-
sonal right" should not be barred by a rational basis standard. Justice Goldberg
noted:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where funda-
mental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged
by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has
some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state
purpose. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon per-
sonal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subor-
dinating interest which is compelling.,
83
After Griswold the Court has continued to expand upon the right of privacy to
include not only the interests protected by the common-law action, but also to
protect the autonomy of the individual to make certain personal decisions.
These areas include the right to be free of warrantless searches84 and the right to
make decisions regarding marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education free of governmental interference.85
B. The Birth of the Tort for the Publication of Private-facts
Although the constitutional privacy cases give a person an expectation
of privacy from governmental interference, these cases do little to help reveal
whether such a strong privacy right should also translate into common tort
law.86 As Professor Zimmerman explained, the constitutional right of privacy
does not necessarily require that the same protection be applied to ordinary tort
law.87 "Although we may be tempted to accord individuals the same protection
from their neighbor's prying as the Constitution provides against governmental
invasions, such an equation conflicts both with the historical distinction between
constitutional and common law and with the First Amendment rights of our
neighbors." 88 However, an examination of a few early cases and the develop-
81 Id. at 484.
82 Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J. concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Doug-
las, J. dissenting)).
83 Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J. concurring) (citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
84 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
85 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
86 Zimmerman supra note 34, at 298.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 298-99.
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ment of the Restatement (Second) of Torts on the public disclosure of private-
facts show how a common-law right of privacy can be given a legitimate role in
the balancing process between privacy and the First Amendment right to free
speech and press.
1. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D
In 1977, the American Law Institute recognized an opening for civil li-
ability for the publication of private-facts. The Restatement addressed the hur-
dles that a plaintiff would have to overcome more clearly, specifically the "le-
gitimate public interest" element. In developing a tort for the publication of
private-facts, the Restatement explained:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that:
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public 89
Furthermore, in the comments to this Restatement section, the drafters made
clear that the focus of this tort is whether the publicized facts, private or not, are
of a legitimate public interest.90 The drafters stated that "[tihe common law has
long recognized that the public has a proper interest in learning about many mat-
ters. When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern,
there is no invasion of privacy." 9' In particular, the drafters explained that the
First Amendment right to free speech and press overrides a claim for publication
of private-facts when the situations involve the coverage of "voluntary public
figures, 92 of some "involuntary public figures, 93 of "all matters of the kind
customarily regarded as news, 94 and of information given to the public "for
purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, where the public may rea-
sonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published." 95
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
90 Id.
91 Id., cmt. d.
92 Id., cmt. c.
93 Id., cmt. d (extending the First Amendment privilege to those "who have sought publicity or
consented to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise have ... become news").
94 Id., cmt. e.
95 Id., cmt. h.
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2. What is of a Legitimate Public Interest?: How Early Case Law
Addressed the Tension Between the First Amendment and the
Publication of Private-facts
Prior to the Supreme Court's take on the legitimacy of the tort of the
publication of private-facts, a few early cases tackled the issue addressed in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts - whether the publicized facts where of a legiti-
mate public interest. Three major cases addressed the public disclosure of pri-
vate-facts tort prior to the Supreme Court: 96 Melvin v. Reid,97 Sidis v. F-R Pub-
lishing Corp.,98 and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.99 Though not exactly
worded as such, each of these cases examined whether the material published
was of a "legitimate public interest."'' 1° To determine the meaning of this elu-
sive term, the courts performed a balancing test of sorts.'0 1 However, unlike
more recent cases, these three cases gave much more weight and concern to the
right of privacy.
In Melvin v. Reid the defendant made a motion picture entitled, "The
Red Kimono."'10 2 This movie used the plaintiffs maiden name to depict her as a
prostitute who had been involved in a sensational murder trial several years ear-
lier. 103 When the picture was released, the plaintiff had ended her scandalous
lifestyle and was married living a respectable, quiet life. 104 No one in the plain-
tiffs social circle knew about her past until the movie was released. 0 5 Due to
the movie's release, the plaintiff claimed her friends "scorn[ed] and abandon[ed]
her and [the movie] exposed her to obloquy, contempt, and ridicule, causing her
grievous mental and physical suffering. ' 1°6
The Fourth District Court of California, one of California's immediate
appellate courts, upheld the plaintiffs invasion of privacy claim, based on the
96 Although these are the main cases concerning the early developments on the public disclo-
sure of private-fact torts, there are two other cases that discuss this issue prior to the Supreme
Court's ruling on this topic. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1942) (holding
that the press enjoyed no privilege to publish intimate details and photos of a hospitalized person's
unique disease) and Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964) (uphold-
ing a woman's invasion of privacy claim against a photo of her while her dress had been blown
above her waist by a jet of air).
97 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
98 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
99 483 P.2d 34, 49 (Cal. 1971), overruled in part by Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 34
Cal. 4th 679 (2004).
1oo See Melvin, 297 P. at 92; Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809; Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 39-41.
101 See supra notes 97-100.
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Warren-Brandeis article and upon a provision of the California constitution that
guaranteed the "inalienable rights" of "enjoying and defending life and liberty;
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness."' 0 7 After examining eight principles that helped the court
balance the publisher's First Amendment rights and the plaintiffs privacy
rights, 108 the court reasoned that there was no justification for using the actual
name of the plaintiff. 109 In particular the court noted:
The use of appellant's true name in connection with the inci-
dents of her former life in the plot and advertisements was un-
necessary and indelicate and a willful and wanton disregard of
that charity which should actuate us in our social intercourse
and which should keep us from unnecessarily holding another
up to the scorn and contempt of upright members of society." °
Although not specifically terming her tort claim as the illegal publication of
private-facts, the court was willing to overcome First Amendment concerns in
favor of the plaintiff s right to not have her personal, private life disclosed to the
general public.
Next, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Sidis v. F-R
Publishing Corp., examined an early version of the public disclosure of private-
facts tort and dismissed the claim in favor of the First Amendment."' But,
107 Id. at 93.
108 Id. at 92-93. The eight principles that the court examined were:
1. The right of privacy was unknown to the ancient common law.
2. It is an incident of the person and not of property -- a tort for which a right
of recovery is given in some jurisdictions.
3. It is a purely personal action and does not survive, but dies with the person.
4. It does not exist where the person has published the matter complained of,
or consented thereto.
5. It does not exist where a person has become so prominent that by his very
prominence he has dedicated his life to the public and thereby waived his right
to privacy. There can be no privacy in that which is already public.
6. It does not exist in the dissemination of news and news events, nor in the
discussion of events of the life of a person in whom the public has a rightful
interest, nor where the information would be of public benefit as in the case of
a candidate for public office.
7. The right of privacy can only be violated by printings, writings, pictures or
other permanent publications or reproductions, and not by word of mouth.
8. The right of action accrues when the publication is made for gain or profit.
(This however is questioned in some cases.)
Id.
109 Id. at 93.
110 Id.
III 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
2005]
15
Taylor: Small Hope Floats: How the Lower Courts Have Sunk the Right of Pr
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
unlike Melvin, this case involved a person considered a "public figure," which
often involves a higher deference to the First Amendment.1 2 The New Yorker
Magazine featured a brief biographical sketch about a child prodigy who, years
before, had been previously known to the public, but now spent his life as a
ministerial clerk in obscurity and seclusion.' 13 The article contained true details
about the plaintiffs life, but was "merciless in its dissection of intimate details
of its subject's personal life."'1 14
The court dismissed the former child prodigy's invasion of privacy
claim based somewhat on a newsworthy defense. 1 5 In particular, the court rea-
soned that "the interest of the individual in privacy must inevitably conflict with
the interest of the public in news."' 16 Because the plaintiff was a "public fig-
ure," the court held in favor of the defendant-publisher.'1 7 However, the court,
in this case, did acknowledge that there may be incidents were the newsworthi-
ness of a matter would not constitute a complete defense for the media." 8 The
court mentioned that the defense may not hold up where "[r]evelations may be
so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notions of decency." 1 9 This notation by the court seemed to indi-
cate that the court would be willing to allow a cause of action for the publication
of private-facts if the plaintiff was not a public figure and if the details revealed
would outrage the community. Although not specific, this dicta did leave some
room for plaintiff to legitimately argue for privacy rights over the First Amend-
ment when dealing with the publication of private-facts.
Finally, the California Supreme Court, in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Association, Inc., addressed whether the passage of time could affect the plain-
tiffs ability to recover for invasion of privacy.120 The plaintiff in this case sued
Reader's Digest for invasion of privacy for publishing an article which dis-
closed his involvement in a truck hijacking eleven years prior. 2 1 Although the
court recognized that the publicly-available reports on the hijacking were
newsworthy and therefore can be published without punishment, it also rea-
soned that little public purpose was served by the publication of the plaintiff's
name in the story.122 The court specifically reasoned that "[u]nless the individ-
112 Id. at 809.
113 Id. at 807.
114 Id.




119 Id. This case begins the community mores test adopted by the Virgil case mentioned below.
120 483 P.2d 34, 49 (Cal. 1971), overruled in part by Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 34
Cal. 4th 679 (2004).
121 Id. at 36.
122 Id. at 40.
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ual has reattracted the public eye to himself in some independent fashion, the
only public 'interest' that would usually be served is that of curiosity." 123 In
addition, the court also reasoned that some balancing should be done between
the First Amendment and the right of privacy. The court stated that "the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right
to privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum of in-
trusion upon the other."' 24
In conclusion, prior to the Supreme Court's discussion of the public dis-
closure of private-facts tort, a few lower courts and the American Law Institute
struggled with the tension between the First Amendment right to free speech
and free press and the rights of the individual to "be let alone." In their struggle
to deal with this tension, these early court cases and the Restatement advocated
a balancing test to determine what is of a "legitimate public interest." These
early cases did not immediately dismiss the plaintiffs claim to privacy in favor
of an almost per se bar of the plaintiff's claim by the First Amendment. Instead,
each court took a closer examination of the plaintiffs privacy rights to deter-
mine where the court should draw the line as to what information is of a legiti-
mate public interest and what information should remain private.
IV. LEAVING A SMALL HOPE BEHIND: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S TAKE ON
THE PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE-FACTS
The U.S. Supreme Court first left a hope that a plaintiff could success-
fully bring a cause of action for the publication of private-facts over a First
Amendment defense with a footnote in Time, Inc. v. Hill.125 Time, Inc. was a
false light invasion of privacy case involving a story published in Life magazine
about the opening of the play The Desperate Hours.126 The play was based on
the widely publicized incident in which the Hill family was held hostage in their
own home by three escaped convicts. 127 The portrayal by the magazine was not
entirely accurate, but it was not defamatory either. 128 The Supreme Court did
hold that the magazine could be liable for "false reports of matters of public
interest," but only after the plaintiff has established actual malice. 2
9
The Supreme Court was clear to limit its holding in Time, Inc. to cases
involving false light claims. However, in a footnote, the court eluded to the
123 Id.
124 Id. at 42.
125 385 U.S. 374, 383 n. 7 (1967).
126 Id. at 377.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 395-96.
129 Id. at 388.
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possibility that a valid claim could exist for the truthful publication of private-
facts.' 30 This footnote stated:
This limitation to newsworthy persons and events does not of
course foreclose an interpretation of the statute to allow dam-
ages where "revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted
in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notions of decency." This case presents no question whether
truthful publication of such matter could be constitutionally pro-
scribed.
131
After the Time, Inc. case, the availability of a tort for truthful publication of pri-
vate-facts was given closer examination in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
132
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,133 and Florida Star v. B.F.J.
34
A. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn: Allowing the Publication of Private-facts
Received From Public Records
The plaintiff in Cox Broadcasting was the father of a 17-year-old de-
ceased rape victim who sued a television station claiming invasion of privacy.
35
The station had released his daughter's name in violation of a Georgia statute
forbidding such publication. 36 The television reporter had discovered the vic-
tim's name while he was examining the indictments for the trial. 137 These in-
dictments were public records available for inspection.1 38 Neither party disputed
that the information publicized was truthful.
139
The Supreme Court made a narrow decision in this case, holding that
the First Amendment bars a cause of action for invasion of privacy grounded
upon publication of information obtained from official court records open to the
public.140  The Court specifically refused to address the broader question of
"whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability
consistent with the First Amendment."' 4' However, the Supreme Court did note
130 Id. at 383 n. 7.
131 Id. at 383 (quoting Sidias v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940)).
132 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
133 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
134 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
135 Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 472-74.
136 Id. at 472.
137 Id. at 473-74.
138 Id. at 472.
139 Id. at 472-73.
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that "there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual within which the
state may protect ... from intrusion by the press."'
42
To determine what is considered a legitimate public interest in this spe-
cific case, the Court did engage in some balancing between the First Amend-
ment and the right of privacy. 43 First, it recognized that "[t]he developing law
surrounding the tort of invasion of privacy recognizes a privilege in the press to
report the events of judicial proceedings."' 44 The Court, like previous lower
court decisions, focused on whether the publication of this information is of a
legitimate public interest to determine when privacy ends and First Amendment
protection begins. 145 It reasoned that, in a broad sense, "[t]he commission of
crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the
prosecutions, however, are without question events of legitimate concern to the
public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the
operations of government."146
Second, the Court recognized that even "[t]he Warren and Brandeis ar-
ticle, supra, noted that the proposed new right would be limited in the same
manner as actions for libel and slander where such a publication was a privi-
leged communication."'147 Therefore, based on the fact that the information was
already in the public domain through the court documents, the Court concluded
that "the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the in-
terests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the
public record.'
48
B. Smith v. Daily-Mail Publishing Co.: Refusing a Cause of Action When
Information Was Lawfully Obtained
After Cox Broadcasting left open the question of whether private-fact
torts are all together barred by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in
Smith v. Daily-Mail Publishing Co. 149 again refused the opportunity to settle
this constitutional debate. In Daily-Mail, a West Virginia newspaper was pun-
ished for publicizing the name of a juvenile offender.150 In West Virginia, the
publication of such information was forbidden by statute without the permission
142 Id. at 487.
143 See id. at 492-94.
144 Id. at 493.
145 Id. at 492.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 495. Basically, the Supreme Court used a balancing test of sorts when it concluded
that the right of privacy was outweighed by First Amendment rights when the information pub-
lished was obtained from public records.
149 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
150 Id. at 99-100.
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of the circuit court judge. 15 The newspaper reporter had obtained the name of a
juvenile involved in a school shooting by interviewing other students, teachers
and police officers.
152
The court in Daily-Mail held that the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause a state cannot punish the press for publishing information that is truthful
and was obtained lawfully. 53 The court also noted that "state action to punish
the publication of truthful information can seldom satisfy constitutional stan-
dards."'154 Although this case did not outright ban a cause of action for the pub-
lication of truthful facts, the Court severely limited its usefulness by strictly
defining what is of a legitimate public interest.
155
C. The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Supreme Court's Last Word on the Pub-
lication of the Private-facts
The Florida Star v. B.J. F.156 is the most recent case where the Supreme
Court could have squarely eliminated the publication of private-facts as uncon-
stitutional. Instead, the court once again made a narrow holding and alluded to
the fact that private-fact torts may be constitutional in some circumstances. 157 In
this case, The Florida Star was sued for invasion of privacy because it published
the name of a rape victim that it obtained from a publicly released police re-
port. 5 8 In Florida the publication of rape victim's names was illegal.' 59
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court recognized that they are faced
with a constitutional question that causes a clash between the First Amendment
and an individual's privacy rights.' 60 The court even noted that there may be
times when the publication of a rape victim's name may be subject to civil li-
ability.' 6' However, the court did not extend such a determination in this case.
Instead, the court narrowly held that "where a newspaper publishes truthful in-
formation which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed,
if at all, only when [there is a] narrowly tailored state interest of the highest or-
der."'162 No such interest was present in this case as the court was reluctant to
151 Id. at 98-99.
152 Id. at 99.
153 Id. at 104.
154 Id. at 102.
155 See id. at 103.
156 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
157 Id. at 541.
158 Id. at 527-29.
159 Id. at 528-29.
'60 Id. at 533.
161 Id. at 537.
162 Id. at 541.
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punish a newspaper for publication of a fact that was publicly released to the
press through a governmental agency.
163
The court again, in a resemblance of some balancing between the First
Amendment and an individual's right to privacy, mentioned in a footnote that
privacy fades when information is publicly released.' 64 Otherwise, the court
believes, there would be mass self-censorship.1 65 However, unlike the previous
cases, the Supreme Court specifically stated that it was not willing to hold that
"truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amend-
ment."'166 Even more specifically, the court said that it specifically limited its
holding today. 167
We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically consti-
tutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy
within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion
by the press, or even that a State may never punish publication
of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.
168
D. So Where Did the Supreme Court Leave Us?
Cox Broadcasting, Daily-Mail, and Florida Star all examined the possi-
bility of civil liability for private-fact torts. 169 In each of these cases, the Su-
preme Court wrote a limited opinion based on the discreet facts presented in
each situation and in each case, the Supreme Court refused to bar a cause of
action for the publication of private, but truthful facts.' 70 Therefore, these cases
do leave a small hope for future plaintiffs who wish to bring a cause of action
for the disclosure of private-facts. Because the court refused to prohibit the tort,
it can be argued that the Supreme Court believes that there are situations in
which a person's right to privacy can override of the First Amendment.
On the other hand, in each of theses cases, the Court has also limited the
ability of a plaintiff to succeed because the Court has refused to define or ex-
pand the disclosure of private-facts to give it a fighting chance against the im-
portance of the First Amendment right to free press and speech. Therefore,
many commentators have reasoned that these Supreme Court cases have in fact
been the "death nail" for the disclosure of private-facts as a legitimate tort.'7'
163 Id. at 535.
164 Id. at 532, n.7.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 532.
167 Id. at 541.
168 Id.
169 See supra note 29.
170 Id.
171 See generally supra note 34.
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Or, at minimum, some commentators have reasoned that the Court has left little
room for the plaintiff to successfully maneuver. 172 "[T]he Court noted only that
plaintiffs could enforce their privacy rights if: (1) the state narrowly tailors its
punishment to protect a state interest of the highest order, or (2) the defendant
discloses truthful information that was obtained unlawfully.'
' 73
However, regardless of whether the Supreme Court will in the future
determine that the disclosure of private-facts tort is prohibited by the First
Amendment, the Court has currently chosen not to do so leaving the tort a fight-
ing chance of survival - its small hope. But, for this small hope to succeed the
Supreme Court and the lower courts must begin to look at the tension between
the First Amendment and the right of privacy not in terms of absolutism - where
only one concept can prevail in each case - but in terms of rights that must be
balanced against each other in a fair and proportionate way. These rights must
be balanced in a way so that neither interest is overcome by the other and both
rights' principles and ideals remain viable. However, lower courts have yet to
turn this Supreme Court precedent into a test that balances these two interests.
Most of the lower courts have acknowledged a need to balance the interests, but
instead the uniformly rule is that whatever is published was of a legitimate pub-
lic interest, further bringing the private-facts tort to its deathbed.
74
V. THE NEWSWORTHINESS DEFENSE, BALANCING OPTIONS, AND THE BREACH
OF CONFIDENCE TORT: How THE LOWER COURTS HAVE REACTED TO THE
SMALL HOPE LEFT BY THE SUPREME COURT
Instead of defining the boundaries of the public disclosure of private-
facts tort and developing an operational test that balances privacy interests and
the First Amendment rights of free speech and press, most courts have adopted
some version of the newsworthiness defense, which basically involves deferring
to the judgment of the media to determine what is of a legitimate public inter-
est.'75 A few select others have engaged some sort of balancing test between the
First Amendment and the individual's right of privacy. 176 Still yet, other courts
have adopted a new tort entitled, breach of confidence. 177 This section will
closely examine each of these "solutions" developed by the lower courts to
grapple with the determination of what information constitutes a legitimate pub-
lic interest.
172 Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Pri-
vate Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 455 (1996).
173 Id.
174 See infra Section V.
175 See supra note 30.
176 See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128-30 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Bartnicki v. Vop-
per, 532 U.S. 514, 535-41 (2001) (Breyer, J. concurring).
177 See infra Section V(C).
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A. The Newsworthiness Defense: Power to the Press
The newsworthiness defense can be separated into different categories
or types.17 8 The most common understanding of this defense, and that most
used by the lower courts, is the "Leave it to the Press" model developed by Pro-
fessor Diane Zimmerman in her 1982 article.179 Under this definition of the
newsworthiness defense, a court would still recognize the existence of a tort for
the truthful publication of private-facts. 180 But, in determining what material is
of a legitimate public interest, the court will merely defer to the judgment of the
press.181 Although the court would not directly prohibit the tort, no plaintiff
could possibly succeed under this model because the media-defendant, itself,
would always determine that the material published was of a legitimate public
interest.
82
Professor Zimmerman made several justifications for this model. In
particular, she noted that the press often has a better mechanism for determining
what is newsworthy than the courts, as the economic survival of the media out-
let depends on its ability to produce a product that the general public will pur-
chase. 1 83 In noting that social norms of acceptable behavior are "better commu-
nicated through the marketplace than through the courtroom," Professor Zim-
merman stated that "to argue that the press merely 'pander' to public taste at the
lowest common denominator is to make a class-based judgment about the value
of information that people seek." 84 Such a judgment is not consistent with the
First Amendment. 85 As noted supra, the newsworthiness defense has been the
preferred method by the courts when addressing the disclosure of private-facts
tort.
1. The Preferred Method: How the Lower Courts Have Used the
Newsworthiness Defense
The first major case to use a version of the newsworthiness defense was
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corporation.186 As discussed supra, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit determined that the publication of information
178 See Zimmerman, supra note 34, at 350-62.
179 See id. at 353-55; for similar definitions of the newsworthiness defense, see also Bloustein,
supra note 34, at 54; Dendy, supra note 34, at 151; Emerson, supra note 34, at 334; Glasser, supra
note 34, at 27.
180 See Zimmerman, supra note 34, at 353; Dendy, supra note 34, at 151.
181 See Zimmerman, supra note 34, at 353.
182 See id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 354.
185 Id.
186 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
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concerning a recluse child prodigy was newsworthy and therefore of a legiti-
mate public interest. After Sidis, and especially after Cox Broadcasting, many
lower courts have followed this lead by creating an unstoppable newsworthiness
defense for the press and publishers. 187 Three main examples of this are Camp-
bell v. The Seabury Press,88 Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 189 and Haynes
v. Alfred A. Knopf Inc.190
After Cox Broadcasting, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
was the first lower court to adopt a type of the newsworthiness defense through
Campbell v. The Seabury Press. The plaintiff in Campbell brought an action for
libel and invasion of privacy against the author, who was her former brother-in-
law, and publisher of the book Brother to a Dragonfly.191 This book was an
autobiography of the defendant's interaction with the plaintiff's ex-husband, a
famous religious and civil rights leader.192 The plaintiff claimed that portions of
the book describing her marriage constituted an invasion of her right to pri-
vacy. 1
93
The Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiff a civil remedy for the publication
of her private life by holding that a logical nexus existed between the informa-
tion disclosed about the plaintiff's marriage and the impact it had on the subject
of the book; therefore, the information disclosed was newsworthy and of a le-
gitimate public interest. 94 The court did not go through any lengthy analysis to
prove that the nexus existed, but simply said that "a review of the record" sup-
ported it.' 95 In addition, this court expanded the traditional definition of the
newsworthiness defense by reasoning that "[t]his . . . privilege is not merely
limited to the dissemination of news either in the sense of current events or
commentary upon public affairs."' 96 Instead, "the privilege extends to informa-
tion concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate so that individuals may cope
with the exigencies of their period."'
' 97
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Gilbert v. Medical
Economics Co. also adopted the newsworthiness defense after Cox Broadcast-
ing.' 98 This case ruled that the circumstances to defeat a defendant's First
187 See supra note 30.
188 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
189 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
190 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
191 Campbell, 614 F.2d at 396.
192 Id.
193 Id.




198 Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981).
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Amendment privilege to publish truthful information are present in only very
extreme cases. 199 The plaintiff in Gilbert sued because of an article published in
the periodical Medical Economics.20°° The article dealt with two incidents of
medical malpractice committed by the plaintiff.20' In additional to describing
these incidents, the article included information about the doctor's "history of
psychiatric and related personal problems., 20 2 The court held that the plaintiffs
suit was blocked by the First Amendment because the information published
added credibility to the story and were linked in the article as to why the doctor
committed the malpractice.2 3 In coming to this conclusion, the court reasoned
that the First Amendment privilege protects all things that are newsworthy
which only excludes extreme cases where the "editor abuses his broad discre-
tion. 20" No other direction or specific guidelines were given. Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit expressly adopted the "leave it to the press" model.
Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Haynes v.
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. also adopted a version of the newsworthiness defense.20 5
The plaintiff in Haynes sued the author and publisher of the popular social his-
tory The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed
America.206 Throughout the book, the author specifically identified the plaintiff
by name while discussing his previous marriage and sexual proclivity with the
207book's main character. The court held that the invasion of privacy claim was
barred by the First Amendment because the information published was of a le-
gitimate public interest.20 8 In coming to this conclusion, the court used a version
of the newsworthiness defense by recognizing that the information published
must be more newsworthy than "the thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy.' '
Although the court does not define the newsworthiness defense as liberally as
the "leave to it the press" model, it does narrowly limit a potential plaintiff's
ability to recover for the publication of truthful private-facts.
Although Campbell, Gilbert, and Haynes are three main examples of
how the lower courts have treated the small hope left by the Supreme Court,
several other courts have followed a similar pattern. 2  These lower courts have
199 Id.
200 Id. at 306.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 308-09.
204 Id. at 308.
205 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
206 Id. at 1224.
207 Id. at 1224-25.
208 Id. at 1232.
209 Id.
210 See, e.g., Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a book
written by a man acquitted of murder criticizing his attorney's trial tactics was not invasion of
20051
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consistently sided with the First Amendment, limiting private-fact torts to un-
known and undetermined extreme cases.2 ' Therefore, under the newsworthi-
ness defense as interpreted by these courts, no plaintiff would be able to prevail
for a private-fact tort unless the publication of the truthful information is so ex-
treme as to override this defense. Furthermore, a majority of these courts have
deemed anything that the media has published as automatically newsworthy and
therefore, automatically of a legitimate public interest.
212
2. Problems with the Newsworthiness Defense: Where are the
Privacy Interests?
Although the newsworthiness defense has been adopted by many courts,
it has undergone severe criticism by many commentators who believe that
courts are too timid in defining the meaning of "legitimate public interest., 21 3 In
particular, these commentators discuss the endless bounds of the defense. 214
They note that the defense is extremely vague because it "fails to protect an
individual's interest in privacy not only because the plaintiff - as opposed to the
press - must identify the limits to the newsworthiness privilege but because the
terms used to define 'newsworthiness' are themselves vague and ambiguous. ' 21 5
In addition, the nexus of the newsworthiness defense and the First Amendment
has also been questioned because "'newsworthiness defense seemingly derived
from the nature of the public disclosure tort itself, rather than from the First
Amendment.'
216
But, more importantly, as one commentator expressly explained, the use
of the newsworthiness defense either "evades the issue or gives exclusive
weight to First Amendment rights. 2 7 Therefore, these courts refused to give
the tension between the First Amendment and the right to privacy justice. In-
stead, they rely on an absolutism concept where the courts feel that they must
privacy as the book was more opinion than fact); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that the release of the names and identities of two men depicted in a video engag-
ing in homosexual activities with a priest did not involve an invasion of privacy); Meeropol v.
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977) (reasoning that activities of the Rosenberg children,
whose identity as such were known, as published in a book about their parents, former Nazi spies,
are within the "orbit of public interest and scrutiny"); for state courts that follow this reasoning,
see supra note 33.
211 See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
212 See supra note 30.
213 Bloustein, supra note 34, at 55-57; see also Dendy, supra note 34, at 163-64; Emerson,
supra note 34, at 342; Glasser, supra note 34, at 31; c.f. Zimmerman, supra note 34, at 353.
214 See supra note 34.
215 Glasser, supra note 34, at 31.
216 Sharon Carton, The Poet, the Biographer and the Shrink: Psychiatrist-Patient Confidential-
ity and the Anne Sexton Biography, 10 U. MiAMi ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 117, 133 (1993).
217 Emerson, supra note 34, at 342.
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choose between the First Amendment and the right of privacy. Because the
newsworthiness defense puts too much power in the hands of the defendant-
publisher, the courts should look for another solution to determine what is of a
legitimate public interest that more fairly addresses all of the concerns instead of
just one - the First Amendment.
B. Professor Emerson's Balancing Test: A Fairer Examination of the
Problem
In an effort to find a solution to the tension between the First Amend-
ment and privacy interests, Professor Thomas Emerson created a balancing test
that the courts could use to address the issue. Although Professor Emerson, in
developing his balancing solution, acknowledged that balancing tests are often
vague and ineffective, he stated that "it may be possible to refine the balancing
process by isolating specific types of interests, rejecting some claimed interests,
giving special weight to others, utilizing presumptions, and otherwise laying the
basis for a common law development of the issues. ' '21 8 To make the balancing
test more predictable, Professor Emerson placed more emphasis on the privacy
side of the scales.219 In particular, he stated that his balancing test "would give
primary attention to a number of factors which derive ultimately from the func-
tions performed by privacy and the expectations of privacy that prevail in con-
temporary society." 20 These factors include: (1) emphasis on elements of inti-
macy to determine the zone of privacy, 22' (2) the non-protection of information
from judicial or administrative procedures,222 (3) the public status of the person
claiming invasion of privacy,22 and (4) allowing the "breathing space" for the
press.
224
After Professor Emerson developed his balancing test, which placed
more weight on privacy rights, a few courts have come close to following a bal-
ancing test that does more than completely ignore privacy interests. In particu-
lar, Virgil v. Times, Inc22 5 became the first case to set a definitive standard thatcourts could follow when determining whether the material published is of a
218 Id.
219 Id. at 343.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 343-44. Professor Emerson specifically mentions sexual relations, bodily functions,
and family relations as elements of intimacy.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. Specifically, Professor Emerson noted, under this factor, that "[ilt must not force the
press into self-censorship, or in any way force it to refrain from legitimate expression, by reason
of uncertainty as to where the boundaries lie, fear of costly litigation, or a desire to avoid possible
trouble."
225 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
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"legitimate public interest.' '226 The plaintiff in Virgil sued for invasion of pri-
227
vacy after he willingly gave interviews to a Sports Illustrated reporter. The
plaintiff later revoked consent when he learned that the article would contain
details about his somewhat erratic behavior.228
In determining that the plaintiffs cause of action should go to the
jury,229 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made several strong
statements about the importance of privacy. 230 Before announcing a standard,
the court recognized that merely discussing private-facts with another person
does not mean that that person is free to make those facts public.231 More im-
portantly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the First Amendment does not protect
the right to pry into an individual's private life.232 Thus, the court indirectly
rejected the "leave it to the press" model of the newsworthiness defense. 33 Fur-
thermore, the court recognized the need to protect privacy so that people can
maintain an enjoyable quality of life234 by developing a balancing test to deter-
mine what is the meaning of a legitimate public interest. The court stated that:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, ac-
count must be taken of the customs and conventions of the
community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a
matter of the community mores. The line is to be drawn when
the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the
public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying
into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable
member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he
had no concern.235
Although the Ninth Circuit does not go as far as Professor Emerson in
emphasizing privacy rights in its balancing test, this court does go further than
most others by recognizing the importance of implementing a balancing test, as
opposed to automatically determining that First Amendment rights prevail over
privacy rights.236 Instead, this court allows the community to determine what
226 See J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483,
507-08 (1985).
227 Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1123-25.
228 Id. at 1124.
229 Id. at 1130.
230 Id. at 1126-28.
231 Id. at 1127.
232 Id. at 1128.
233 Id.
234 Id.
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information should be protected under the truthful publication of private-
facts.237 In particular, the court stated "[w]here competing values are involved,
unless one competitor is to be sacrificed outright, those involved with the com-
petition must accept that risks are inherent and the problem lies in attempting to
minimize them to the extent that the conflict permits. 238 In conclusion, the
Virgil court actually added to the balancing test by including an additional factor
- a determination by the community of what is of a legitimate public interest.
23 9
Finally, the Virgil court does not use an absolutism concept and attempts to
come to a middle ground when confronted with a case that puts the First
Amendment against the right of privacy.
Another relevant example of an appropriate balancing test between the
First Amendment and privacy rights occurred at a higher level - Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion in Bartnicki v. Vopper.240 The plaintiffs in Bart-
nicki sued because a local radio show played a tape-recorded conversation about
a hotly contested issue involving the local teacher union.241 The recorded con-
versation contained threats made by one local school board member against
242
other members if they chose not vote the plaintiff's way. Although the con-
versation was illegally recorded, the radio outlet that played the conversation
was unaware of this fact.
243
The Bartnicki majority decided a very narrow issue, namely "[w]here
the punished publisher of the information has obtained the information in ques-
tion in a manner lawful in itself, but from a source who has obtained it unlaw-
fully, may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information
based on the defect?' 244 Although the court recognized that there is an impor-
tant interest in protecting an individual's privacy, 245 it reasoned that privacy
246
concerns give way when compared to publishing matters of public concern.
In the end, the majority held that a "stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to
237 Id.
238 Id. at 1129-30.
239 Id. at 1129.
240 532 U.S. 514, 535-41 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
241 Id. at 518-19. The issue involved collective bargaining negotiations between the Pennsyl-
vania Student Education Association, on behalf of the teachers at Wyoming Valley West High
School, and the local school board.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 519. Most likely, the station could have figured out that the conversation was illegally
recorded. Id. at 525. But, the point in the case became that the media outlet came into the infor-
mation lawfully. Id. at 528.
244 Id. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484-85 (Sentelle, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)).
245 Id. at 533.
246 Id. at 534.
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remove the First Amendment shield from speech that involves a matter of public
concern."
247
Although agreeing with the ultimate holding of the majority, Justice
Breyer, in his concurring opinion, takes a different path to the same result.
Breyer, in developing his own balancing test, stated that a strict scrutiny analy-
sis is out-of-place when dealing with competing constitutional interests.248
Breyer then compared the First Amendment rights and the privacy interest at
issue in this case.249 First, he explained that the Constitution demands that all
laws aimed at protecting an individual's privacy must be tailored to reconcile
the tension between media and privacy interests. Second, he noted that sev-
eral factors cause the disclosure of the conversations to have a high level of pub-
lic interest251 These factors include the fact that the conversation dealt with
potential harm to others and that the conversations were limited to public figures
252that are subject to more public scrutiny than private citizens. In the end,
Breyer noted that some intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others and
therefore deserve higher protection and balancing weight.253 However, in this
case, the privacy concerns were relatively low and the public interest was very
high.254
Breyer's concurring opinion clearly lays out the importance of balanc-
ing First Amendment and privacy rights. Instead of outright rejecting the pri-
vacy rights as unimportant, Breyer goes through a balancing test to determine
which right outweighs the other.255 Because this case involves the tension be-
tween privacy and the First Amendment, Breyer is able to do a fair balancing
test - one that may be followed by the lower courts when addressing this issue.
In conclusion, although neither Breyer's concurring opinion nor the
Virgil court went as far as Professor Emerson in protecting privacy rights, these
two decisions can serve as the foundation for courts that would want to do jus-
tice to the tension between First Amendment and privacy rights. Breyer's con-
currence in Bartnicki and the Virgil court give other courts guidelines that more
fairly help to determine when disclosed information is of a legitimate public
interest. Based on these cases, other courts could weigh the importance of pri-
vacy rights over First Amendment rights by focusing on factors such as the ex-
tent to which the published information dealt with a public figure, the impact of
the publication on the private individual, the impact of the publication on the
247 Id. at 535.
248 Id. at 536.
249 Id. at 537.
250 Id. at 538.
251 Id. at 539.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 540.
254 Id. at 539-40.
255 Id. at 538-40.
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community, and the right of the community to legitimately know this informa-
tion.256
C. An Emerging Possibility: Breach of Confidence
According to one commentator, there are two common law mechanisms
that are "designed to provide a remedy when personal information is disclosed -
invasion of privacy and breach of confidence. 257 Breach of confidence is a
"legally enforceable duty of confidentiality if the confider has indicated, either
in writing or orally, a desire to exercise control over the disclosure of the infor-
mation, and the confidant has 'explicitly and voluntarily agreed to hold [the
information] in confidence.' ' 258 Both of these remedies can trace their origin to
the same old English case - Prince Albert v. Strange.25 9 However, the Ameri-
can court system has used this starting point to develop invasion of privacy law
while the English court system has used this case to develop a theory of recov-
ery entitled breach of confidence.26
Over the past century and a half, English courts have further developed
the breach of confidence as a tort theory of recovery.26' In particular, the Eng-
lish court system has determined that breach of confidence can be a valid claim
where: (1) the parties have a contract; (2) there was a pre-existing relationship
between the parties; and (3) "the unilateral imposition of such a duty by the con-
fider telling the confident that the information is given 'in confidence.' ' 262 Even
when there is no expressed or implied contract between the parties, the English
courts have allowed a breach of confidence claim to continue where there was
an employer/employee, lawyer/client, doctor/patient, or priest/penitent relation-
ship. The English courts have also allowed the plaintiff to bring a successful
breach of confidence claim "where a husband proposed to reveal his marital
secrets; where a woman disclosed the revelations of a close friend; and, where a
litigant revealed information produced during discovery in a civil case. 263
Although the American court system chose to pursue the invasion of
privacy route to protect the publication of private-facts, many scholars have
noted that this has been made unsuccessful by the lower courts' interpretations.
256 For more development of this, see infra, Section VI.
257 Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasion of
Privacy, 43 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 4 (1995).
258 G. Michael Harvey, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2425 (1992).
259 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849).
260 Gilles, supra note 257, at 4-5.
261 See id. at 10-14.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 12-13.
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Therefore, the breach of confidence tort has been seen by some to be a bright
264
new light in the protection of a person's privacy.
1. The Three Categories of American Breach of Confidence
Currently, American courts have allowed a breach of confidence cause
of action to continue within three categories of recovery: (1) contract, (2) fidu-
ciary duty, and (3) tort. First, under the contract theory for breach of confi-
dence, "express written contracts, binding the signer to hold information confi-
dential, have long been used in the commercial area, particularly by employers
to prevent employees from revealing business secrets., 265 An example of this
type of cause of action is Snepp v. U.S.266 In that case, a former CIA agent
wrote a book without submitting the manuscript to the agency beforehand.267
The agent was required to do so through an employment contract he signed
when joining the agency. When Snepp published his book, the government
sued for breach of contract. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the government's
claim and reasoned that Snepp, the CIA agent, was bound by his contract
agreement to not publish the book without submitting it for review by the
agency first.268 Therefore, the Court required the CIA agent to abide by his
promise to keep secret the confidential information he learned while employed
by the CIA because of his written employment contract.
Second, a fiduciary cause of action exists when the plaintiff can show
that a fiduciary relationship existed between himself and the defendant. "Where
such a relation exists, a fiduciary is under a duty to act for the benefit of the
other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the relation., 269 This
cause of action can also be characterized as a duty of loyalty that includes a duty
not to disclose information.27° Under the area of fiduciary duty breach of confi-
dence, there are two main types of cases: doctor-patient 271 and banker-
272depositor.
An example of the fiduciary duty breach of confidence cause of action
is Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank.273 In this case, an officer of the plain-
264 See Gilles, supra note 257, at 9; Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 1426, 1456 (1982); Zimmerman, supra note 34, at 362-63.
265 Gilles, supra note 257, at 15.
266 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
267 Id. at 507-08.
268 Id. at 516.
269 Gilles, supra note 257, at 39.
270 Id.
271 See, e.g., Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1958); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668,
674 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
272 See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961).
273 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961).
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tiffs employer had asked a bank manager to inform him of any problems the
plaintiff had that may reflect badly upon the company.274 The manager then
wrote the employer, explaining that plaintiffs financial position was bad. 75 The
Idaho Supreme Court examined the relationship between the banker and the
plaintiff to determine if the plaintiff has a valid breach of confidence claim.276
The court compared the plaintiff and the banker's relations to that of an agent
and principal.277 Then the court stated that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, an agent
is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information
confidentially given to him by the principal .... ,,278 Therefore, under this cause
of action, courts have long used the theory to allow recovery when there is no
specific contract, but where a fiduciary relationship exists.
Although contract and fiduciary breach of confidence causes of action
have existed for many years within America, these two theories can be limiting
to a plaintiff who wishes to recover for public disclosure of private-facts be-
cause the plaintiff must prove that an expressed or implied contract existed or
that a fiduciary relationship existed. In addition, the injuries the plaintiff in a
disclosure of private-fact case will suffer typically involve loss of income, loss
of reputation, and mental distress and anguish. 279 However, in contract cases
damages are limited to those that "'may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of breach of it.' 280 Fiduciary duty cases can also limit dam-
ages. Typically, depending on the case, the plaintiff can enjoin the defendant
from releasing the information and/or recover damages based on the profit the
defendant received from the information.281 Therefore, under this cause of ac-
tion, damages are evaluated in terms of the gain to the defendant instead of the
loss to the plaintiff.
Because of the limitation of damages and the difficulties in proving a
breach of confidence case within the contract and fiduciary duty realm, several
people have looked and encouraged the courts to adopt breach of confidence as
a tort theory of liability. Commentators have described the tort as the disclosure
of information learned in a confidential relationship.282 By allowing a breach of
confidence cause of action as a tort, the plaintiff could potentially recover for
damages from emotional distress and loss of reputation. In addition, the tort
274 Id. at 286.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 289-90.
277 Id. at 289.
278 Id.
279 Gilles, supra note 257, at 25.
280 Id. at 26.
281 Id. at 48-51.
282 Id. at 52.
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would include disclosures of information that did not directly involve a contract
or a fiduciary relationship.
Two states have adopted a breach of confidence tort: California 83 and
New York.284 However, in both of these states, only the intermediate appellate
levels have adopted the tort. Neither final appellate court has addressed the
issue. In California, the breach of confidence tort is very similar to contractual
relationship breach of confidence cases, where the plaintiff is required to prove
an agreement of confidentiality as an essential element. In Tele-Count Engi-
neers, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company2 85 the plaintiff sued
because the defendant had disclosed the plaintiffs trade secrets and other in-
formation to companies that were the plaintiffs competitors.286 A California
Court of Appeals held that the cause of action was legitimate because the plain-
tiff was able to rely on an implied obligation or contract between the parties.287
The plaintiff had understood that the defendant would not disclose this informa-
tion to others.288
Similarly, the New York courts have required that the parties have ei-
ther a fiduciary relationship or that an implied contract existed.289 In Mac-
Donald v. Clinger, the plaintiff sued because the defendant, a psychiatrist, dis-
closed personal information about the plaintiff that was learned during the
course of his treatment.290 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
held that the plaintiff and defendant's relationship "gives rise to an implied
covenant which, when breached, is actionable." 291 In addition, the court rea-
soned that "[i]f the plainitff's recovery were limited to an action for breach of
contract, however, he would generally be limited to economic loss flowing di-
rectly from the breach ... and would thus be precluded from recovering for men-
tal distress, loss of his employment and the deterioration of his marriage. 292
Therefore, this court believed that "the relationship contemplates an additional
duty springing from but extraneous to the contract and that the breach of such
duty is actionable as a tort.' 29
3
In conclusion, although a breach of confidence tort would allow a plain-
tiff to collect different types of damages, the only two courts to adopt this tort
283 See Tele-Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
284 See MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
285 See Tele-Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
286 Id. at 277-78.
287 Id. at 279-81.
288 Id. at 277-78.
289 See MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
290 Id. at 802.
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still require certain elements of contract and/or fiduciary law to be met before
the plaintiff can recover.
2. But, What Are the Constitutional Issues?
Although strongly encouraged by several commentators,294 the constitu-
tionality of this new "development" is just as questionable as that of the truthful
publication of private-facts tort. 29 1 Courts, as with the truthful publication of
private-facts tort, are likely to challenge the tort's ability to limit a publisher's
speech from the breach of confidence theories.296 The guiding case on the con-
stitutionality of breach of confidence is Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.29 7
The plaintiff in Cohen was promised anonymity in exchange for damag-
ing information about a political candidate for the Lieutenant Governorship in
Minnesota.298 Each of these newspapers independently decided to break the
promise made to Cohen by publishing Cohen's name as part of the story.299
Cohen sued the newspapers under the state's common promissory estoppel doc-
trine. 300 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that Cohen's suit was not barred
by the First Amendment because promissory estoppel law is generally applica-
ble and does not single out the media.30 1 The Court distinguished Cohen's case
from the Florida Star line of cases by claiming that laws of general applicabil-
ity, such as common promissory estoppel law, do not offend the First Amend-
ment.30 2 The court also noted that there was an important distinction between
contract relationships such as this case and suing for information that is already
put into the public domain.30 3
However, although the U.S. Supreme Court allows a breach of confi-
dence cause of action to continue in Cohen, which involved a promissory estop-
pel theory of recovery, this case can be distinguished from the tort breach of
confidence version. The biggest problem for this new tort is that some courts
may also view it as targeting and singling out the media for punishment be-
cause, similar to the problems faced by the private-fact tort, one of the essential
elements of the tort involves limiting information that will be disclosed to the
public.304 On the other hand, there are some advantages to breach of confi-
294 See Gilles, supra note 257, at 65-71.
295 Id.
296 id.
297 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
298 Id. at 665.
299 Id. at 666.
300 Id. at 666-67.
301 Id. at 670.
302 Id. at 669-70.
303 Id. at 670-71.
304 See Gilles, supra note 257, at 79.
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dence. For example, as shown by Cohen and the New York and California
cases, the courts could use the tort framed by contract and fiduciary issues to
bypass any constitutional problems. 30 5 But, ultimately, these cases and the cur-
rent breach of confidence law show that the plaintiffs and the courts are attempt-
ing to allow some privacy rights to continue by re-characterizing and squeezing
what is essentially a private-fact tort claim into a different box in an attempt to
avoid confrontation with the First Amendment. In reality the courts need to
address this tension by properly balancing the privacy interests and the First
Amendment and come to a middle ground where both principles can exist.
VI. THE SOLUTION: How COURTS SHOULD REACT TO THE SMALL HOPE LEFT
BY THE SUPREME COURT
From Cox Broadcasting to Florida Star, the U.S. Supreme Court has
left a small hope for plaintiffs who wish to recover for the truthful publication of
private-facts. 3°6 This small hope is the Supreme Court's continuing refusal to
outright bar the publication of private-facts as a legitimate tort. However, most
lower courts have taken this small hope and sunk it by practically eliminating
the private-fact tort through the newsworthiness defense.3 °7 By using the news-
worthiness defense, the courts are cheating the plaintiffs because these courts
are ignoring the importance of privacy rights in their decisions. Instead, these
courts have latched onto an absolutism concept. This absolutism concept means
that the courts tend to feel that they must make a choice between the First
Amendment and privacy issues. To these courts, there is nothing in between
these concepts - no middle ground. It is important for these courts to take a
closer look at the tension between the First Amendment and privacy rights to
determine an approach that would take both of these important rights into con-
sideration. In order to appropriately address this tension, the courts should open
the small hope left by the Supreme Court by adopting a "pyramid" scheme as a
part of the balancing test to determine a legitimate public interest. Courts
should also adopt some version of breach of confidence as a subset of invasion
of privacy law.
First, it is important for courts to recognize the breach of confidence
theories of liability as a subset of invasion of privacy causes of action. By
adopting breach of confidence, this theory of recovery could help plaintiffs deal
with more common revelations about their private lives. For example, under a
breach of confidence claim, the plaintiff would be able to recover for disclosure
of private information from a person who was engaged in a relationship with the
plaintiff.30 8 Although breach of confidence in its current form would help the
305 Id.
306 See supra Section IV.
307 See supra Section V(A).
308 See supra Section III.
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vast majority of plaintiffs, it is still important for the courts to finally address the
tension between the First Amendment and privacy issues instead of simply re-
categorizing the cause of action to avoid the ultimate issue. Professor Edward
Bloustein, in an early article, began to recognize the importance of having two
separate causes of action and of addressing the tension between these two im-
portant constitutional issues.
Where private information is wrongfully gained and subse-
quently communicated, the wrong is made out independently of
the communication. Communication in such a case, whether to
one person or many, is not of the essence of the wrong and only
goes to enhance damages. This, then, is not an exception to the
rule of mass communication at all. Where, however, a person
chooses to give another information of a personal nature and the
confidence is broken, publication is indeed a requisite of recov-
ery and even limited publication is sufficient to support the ac-
tion. But the wrong here is not the disclosure itself, but rather
the disclosure in violation of a relationship of confidence.3°
As Professor Bloustein alludes to, the release of truthful private information
needs to be protected by two distinct causes of action. Breach of confidence
alone would not be enough to protect individual privacy rights. For example,
the breach of confidence would in theory provide a plaintiff with a cause of ac-
tion if the plaintiff had some sort of fiduciary relationship with the defendant
who disclosed the information. However, the same plaintiff would not have a
cause of action under breach of confidence if the defendant, who she had no
relationship with, stole her diary full of private, embarrassing facts about her,
and published it. Therefore, it is important to address the ultimate problem
when a plaintiff finds that their private information was disclosed to the public.
In order to address this tension and this problem, I believe that the court
should adopt the "pyramid" scheme. By adopting a "pyramid" scheme as a part
of the balancing test to determine what is of a legitimate public interest, the
courts will be better able to draw that fine line between the First Amendment
and privacy rights. To help explain this theory, first, imagine a multi-level
pyramid. Using Mr. Alexander's case as an example, imagine that the bottom
level of the pyramid is general information about criminal proceedings and
crimes. The second level consists of information about the war on drugs. The
third level is information about multiple drug busts in New York City during
which the police confiscated hundreds of kilos of drugs and millions of dollars.
The fourth level is made up of the fact that the Task Force used confidential
informants and undercover agents to help bring down several Colombian drug
cartels. The fifth level is the identity of the main confidential informant - Paul
309 See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
NYU L. REv. 962,980.
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Lir Alexander. The peak of the pyramid contains the specific details about Mr.
Alexander's involvement in the drug busts and other private information identi-
fying Mr. Alexander to the drug lords.
The next step for the court is to determine where to draw the line among
these various levels of the pyramid as to what information is of a legitimate pub-
lic interest and what information is not. When examining the very bottom level
of the pyramid, and even the second and third levels, courts can still apply the
newsworthiness defense as a method to determine what is of a legitimate public
interest because those categories of information are easily considered material
that should be shared with everyone in the marketplace of ideas.
Limiting the publication of such broad, general categories such as those
contained within the first three levels of the pyramid would severely chill
speech and the press as well as undermine the First Amendment and the major
principles behind it. People have a right to know about criminal proceedings
and crimes. People have a right to know about the war on drugs and even spe-
cific incidents of success within this war. Because such information contained
in the first three levels is so important to our society's knowledge of significant
events in their community, the newsworthiness defense is sufficient to satisfy
the tension between the First Amendment and any privacy rights that may be
enclosed within those levels.
However, it is when the courts begin to examine the fourth, fifth and
sixth levels of the pyramid the newsworthiness defense no longer effectively
works to address and confront the tension between the First Amendment and
privacy rights. Instead, these levels contain significant privacy rights that must
be taken into consideration when making a decision as to what information is of
a legitimate public interest. To do so, the courts should adopt a balancing test
similar to that suggested by Professor Emerson.10 In developing the ideal bal-
ancing test, the courts should draw on some of the individual factors developed
by various courts. These factors should include: (1) the identity of the person as
a public figure, 1 (2) whether the information can be obtained from public re-
cords or information publicly released by government,31 2 (3) the duration of
time between disclosure and occurrence of the private information, 3 3 (4)
whether the specific identity of the person served a greater interest than to pro-
mote gossip,314 and (5) whether a reasonable person in the community would
determine that the information is offensive in disclosure.31 5 Other considera-
310 See Emerson, supra note 34, at 343.
311 See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
312 See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989); Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
491 (1975).
313 See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 537 (1971), overruled in part by
Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th 679 (2004).
314 See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 291 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
315 See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D cmt. c (1977).
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tions and factors can be added to this list over time.316 When looking at these
factors, the plaintiffs or defendants do not have to prove or disprove each of
them. Instead, the courts must make their decision based on a totality of the
circumstances.











Crimes and Criminal Procedure
When doing the balancing for the fourth, fifth and sixth levels, the im-
portance of the privacy issues increases as the court and the information dis-
closed moves towards the top of the pyramid or when the more private and
privileged information has been disclosed. For example, again using Mr. Alex-
ander's case, the court would start balancing at the fourth level of the pyramid -
the disclosure to the public that confidential informants were used. Generally,
most courts would probably easily find that someone could disclose to the pub-
lic that confidential informants were used in combating the war on drugs. Basi-
cally, the public has a right and need to know how some police business is con-
ducted in our country and our communities. In addition, since the disclosure
that confidential informants were used does not involve the release of specific
details or identification of these informants, the disclosure of the information is
unlikely to interfere with any major privacy concerns. However, balancing
316 See Emerson, supra note 34, at 344.
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should still be done at this level because there may be some circumstances
where the disclosure would hurt privacy concerns. For example, this may occur
when a police investigation may be harmed by the disclosure.
When the court and the information reaches the fifth and sixth levels of
the pyramid, the privacy interests involved may be intense and ideally, the ques-
tion should go directly to the jury to determine if the information is of a legiti-
mate public interest. But, if the court wants to balance, itself, at these levels to
determine if the privacy interest claims are barred by the First Amendment, then
the court needs to look at the above factors and legitimately consider the impor-
tance of the privacy interests involved while balancing. For example, in Mr.
Alexander's case, the court should not bar privacy interest claims when the dis-
closed information reaches the fifth and sixth levels. First, Mr. Alexander was
not a public figure and information concerning his specific involvement with the
Task Force was never part of the public record before Mr. Kerik's book was
published. Second, the time element is relevant because the information was
disclosed to the public soon enough that it was relevant to the drug lords who
lost millions and who would still be interested in revenge against Mr. Alexander
and his family.
Third, and most importantly, no great public interest was served when
Mr. Kerik disclosed Mr. Alexander's name and specific identifying details about
his involvement with the Task Force. There was nothing added to his book or
story by revealing this information and in the reverse, there would have been
nothing taken away if Mr. Kerik had left Mr. Alexander's name out of his book
or used a fake name when referring to Mr. Alexander. Mr. Kerik would have
still been able to explain to the public about his life story and about his impor-
tant work for the Task Force. The public, without the release of Mr. Alexan-
der's name and identifying information, would still learn about the world of
undercover agents and the war on drugs in New York City. Finally, the dis-
closed information could be viewed as offensive because it could lead to the
death of Mr. Alexander and his family simply because he helped out the gov-
ernment.
Therefore, Mr. Alexander's claims should not have been barred by the
First Amendment because, based on the totality of the circumstances, his pri-
vacy interests should have outweighed any First Amendment concerns. In par-
ticular, as noted above, there is minimal harm to the First Amendment principle
because no greater good was served by including Mr. Alexander's name in Mr.
Kerik's book. Mr. Kerik's ability to publish his book would not have been
harmed or really even limited. He would still be able to express his opinions
and tell his story about his role in the war on drugs even if Mr. Alexander's
claim was successful.
317 See U.S. v. De Los Santos, 810 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121,
130 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Although no balancing test is perfect, the pyramid scheme attempts to
address the major criticisms of using such a balancing test. First, the greater use
of this balancing test would give the test itself great predictability. 3 8 And, as
with much of the law, when dealing with First Amendment and privacy issues,
there can never be complete predictability on the outcome of a case. Second,
because this balancing test is reserved only for specific levels of the pyramid,
the pyramid scheme would not chill or cause a major limitation on speech.
Most notably, the balancing test is mainly reserved for extreme cases when the
tension between the First Amendment and privacy rights is too great to be set-
tled by the newsworthiness defense. Because the courts, using this model, can
continue to use the newsworthiness defense in cases involving general and
common information, the press will have sufficient "breathing space." In addi-
tion, there will be limited uncertainty because the pyramid scheme does not ask
the media to limit disclosure on major aspects that concern the public's interest.
Instead, through the pyramid levels, in combination with a balancing test that
acknowledges the importance of privacy interests, the scheme limits disclosures
to minor and very specific information.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has left a small hope concerning
whether the publication of private-fact torts can be subject to civil liability under
the First Amendment.319 However, many lower courts have taken this opportu-
nity to sink the small hope by severely limiting a plaintiffs ability to state a
cause of action that can escape the newsworthiness defense. 320  Because the
publication of private-facts involves a complex tension between the First
Amendment right to free speech and press and privacy rights, the courts need to
take a new approach - one that would not ignore the importance of an individ-
ual's privacy. 32' To best walk the fine line between the First Amendment and
privacy rights, the courts should adopt the "pyramid" model balancing test,
which helps courts to determine where to draw the line between what is of a
legitimate public interest and what is not. Furthermore, in conducting this bal-
ancing test, the courts should consider several factors, including the identity of
the person as a public figure; 322 the availability of the information through other
public channels, such as public records; 323 the duration of time between disclo-
318 See Emerson, supra note 34, at 344.
319 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
320 See supra Section V(A).
321 See supra Section III.
322 See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1980).
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sure and occurrence of the private infonnation; 324 the specific interest, not
merely promoting gossip, served to the public by divulging the information;
325
and the determination, measured by a reasonable member of the community,
that would find the information offensive in disclosure. 326 Finally, in order to
protect an individual's privacy rights, the courts should also adopt breach of
confidence as a tort cause of action because it will allow the plaintiff to seek tort
damages when the defendant breached a contract or fiduciary duty to keep cer-
tain information confidential.
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